FirstBlood-#736[COLLAB] Phar deserialization to RCE via upload vaccination proof
This issue was discovered on FirstBlood v2.0.0 (issues patched)



On 2021-10-27, amec0e Level 3 reported:

Hi mate,

After a bit help on the issue and looking at a previously disclosed hackerone report i was finally able to get the phar deserialization to remote code execution via the endpoint /vaccination-manager/pub/upload-vaccination-proof.php using phpggc we can create a jpg serialized payload to embed into a legitimate jpg image and upload this. Then using the proof= parameter on the endpoint /api/checkproof.php? which is checking that a file exists we can use phar:// to deserialize our payload and execute our code.

(This is my current understanding of this, which may not be entirely correct)

Impact:

Insecure Deserialization to Remote Code Execution. Remote code execution allows a attacker to execute malicious code on the target server with the permissions of the current user (usually www-data).

Steps to Reproduce:

  • Get phpggc from Github
  • Get a regular jpg image (I used barker-logo.jpg)
  • Generate the serialized payload using the following: ./phpggc -pj barker_logo.jpg -o /tmp/rce.jpg monolog/rce1 system id

We can also verify our payload embedded inside the image using xxd and file commands

Now to continue.

  • Open Burpsuite and make sure "Intercept is off"
  • Visit the endpoint /vaccination-manager/pub/upload-vaccination-proof.php and Select your Image rce.jpg and enter a email and click "Upload"

  • In burpsuite Proxy > HTTP history right click the recent GET request to the endpoint /api/checkproof.php?proof=/app/firstblood/upload/blob.jpg and click "Send to Repeater"
  • Viewing the request in repeater append phar:// to the enpoint /app/firstblood/upload/blob.jpg and click "Send".

You should now receive a reponse showing the current id of the user.

Best Regards,

Amec0e.

In Collaboration with thebinarybot

P1 CRITICAL

Parameter:

Payload:


FirstBlood ID: 34
Vulnerability Type: Deserialization

This endpoint calls filesize() on the path provided in the 'proof' param with no filtering or sanitisation. By adding the phar:// stream handler to the path, an attacker can force a previously uploaded file to be sent through deserialisation. Coupled with the fact that a gadget-chain vulnerable version of monolog is being used, this allows for RCE.